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ABSTRACT 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 
there has been an increase in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 12 
motions to dismiss for lack of patentable subject matter. These motions 
are often granted at the district court level and are predominantly upheld 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). 
This trend creates a hostile environment for inventors and patent holders 
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and threatens to curb innovation in various areas including computer 
software, biotechnology, and medical diagnostics. The Federal Circuit’s 
current application of the Alice test at the Rule 12 stage favors alleged 
infringers and is inconsistent with the standards for evaluating pleadings. 
Additionally, the Alice test is not conducive to being performed at the 
pleading stage of litigation. This paper argues that the Federal Circuit 
should instruct the district courts to refrain from deciding patent subject 
matter eligibility at the pleading stage of litigation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 25, 1994, the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) granted a patent to John R. Gammino titled 
“Telecommunications Device with Simplified Calling Procedures.”1 Mr. 
Gammino’s patent disclosed a method for making telephone calls where 
the call is routed through a central office that determines the method of 
payment for the call.2 In May 2012, Mr. Gammino sued AT&T Corp., 
Verizon Communications, Inc., Sprint Communications Co., and others 
in the telecommunications space for infringing his patent.3 After surviving 
motions to dismiss and amending his complaint, Mr. Gammino was met 
with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 12(c) motion for judgment 
on the pleadings on January 5, 2015.4 The defendants alleged the patent 
was directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.5 The 
court performed the Alice test and determined all the claims ineligible 
under § 101.6 As a result, Mr. Gammino’s patent was held invalid, and he 
lost all rights associated with it. 
Invalidation of a patent has serious consequences for the inventor.7 
The inventor not only loses the case at hand but also loses the right to 
exclude others from practicing the patented invention in the future.8 The 
1. U.S. Patent No. 5,359,643, at [45], [54], and [76] (filed Jan. 26, 1993).
2. Id. at col. 1 ll. 40–52. 
3. Gammino v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d 264, 266 (D. Del. 2015). 
4. Id. at 267 (“On January 5, 2015, Defendants filed their Motion for judgment of patent
ineligibility under § 101 pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 275 (“[C]laim 1—and, thus, all claims of the ‘643 patent—is ineligible under § 101, 
because it is directed to an abstract idea and includes no inventive concept under Mayo/Alice.”). 
7. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J 619, 628 (2018) (“A 
ruling of patent invalidity is the outcome of a patent case that can have the most significant impact 
going forward, both on the parties and on nonparties.”). 
8. Id. (“[O]nce a litigant convinces a court to hold a particular patent invalid, any litigant
accused of infringing the same patent in the future may use that invalidity decision as a complete 
defense.”). 
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fact that invalidation of a patent can occur at the Rule 12 stage creates a 
hostile environment for patent holders and inventors and, as a result, 
harms innovation. 
Section 101 defines the subject matter that is eligible for patent 
protection.9 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories10 and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
International11 redesigned the test for determining whether subject matter 
is eligible for patenting. This test, the Alice test, has brought uncertainty 
into the subject matter eligibility analysis and has become unpopular with 
inventors, practitioners, and judges.12 
Before Alice, motions to dismiss on patent ineligibility grounds were 
rarely brought and rarely granted.13 After Alice, Rule 12 motions based on 
subject matter eligibility dramatically increased. In 2013, the year before 
Alice was decided, district courts decided 11 pleading stage eligibility 
motions.14 In 2015, the year after Alice, that number rose to 101.15 This 
increase is not surprising. Patent litigation is expensive and time 
consuming, making the opportunity for an early decision appealing to 
defendants and judges.16 
Eligibility decisions on the pleadings create an uncertain and hostile 
environment for inventors and patent owners. Despite the presumption of 
validity for patents and the practice of taking all alleged facts in the 
complaint as true when examining motions under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 
12(c), these early decisions invalidate patents at an alarming rate.17 In 
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor . . . .”).  
10. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
11. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
12. Meredith Addy, Alice at Age Four: Time to Grow Up, IPWATCHDOG (Sep. 18, 2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/09/18/alice-age-four-grow-up/id=101447/ 
[https://perma.cc/EZ9Q-2TSD] (characterizing the Alice decision as much-maligned and stating that 
over emphasizing the § 101 analysis causes confusion, which stalls innovation). 
13. Stephanie E. O’Byrne & Jeffrey T. Castellano, On Trend: Rule 12 Dismissals Based on
Patent Ineligibility under § 101, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 405, 408 (2014) (noting that the Federal Circuit 
stated that “Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for patent ineligibility would be improper in most cases”).  
14. Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 660 (“In 2016, district courts decided 149 pleading-stage 
eligibility motions, up from 101 in 2015, 24 in 2014, and 11 in 2013.”). 
15. Id. 
16. Addy, supra note 12 (“Patent cases are notoriously complicated and difficult to resolve.
Sadly, Alice’s novel allure of an early dismissal enticed the district courts time and again to ignore 
established practices. Alice allowed judges to blithely bypass unpacking specific statutory sections, 
avoid application of patent precedent to complicated technologies, and ignore interpretation of patent 
claim terms.”). 
17. Id. (explaining that about 60% of district court decisions addressing eligibility found
ineligible claims; stating that about 74% of those invalidations resulted from Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 
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turn, the invalidations are consistently upheld on appeal by the Federal 
Circuit on an undeveloped record.18 
This article argues that the Federal Circuit should provide guidance 
against deciding eligibility at the pleading stage of litigation. Part II of this 
article begins with an overview of the statutory basis for patent subject 
matter eligibility. This part continues with a discussion of the 
development of subject matter eligibility law at the Supreme Court. Once 
this groundwork is laid, Part III examines the Federal Circuit’s treatment 
of Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions alleging a lack of subject matter 
eligibility. This examination includes analysis of several cases to gain 
insight into the development of subject matter eligibility law and the 
reasoning behind the Federal Circuit’s decisions. Part IV explains why 
patent subject matter should not be decided at the motion to dismiss stage 
of litigation. This discussion analyzes the impact of an invalidity ruling 
on the patentee; the consistency of the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the 
Alice test with the standards for evaluating the sufficiency of pleadings; 
and the ability of the Alice test to be performed in a satisfactory manner 
at an early stage of litigation. Part V concludes with a recommendation 
that courts not determine patent subject matter eligibility at the pleading 
stage of litigation. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY LAW
A. The Statutory Basis for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility 
Patent law finds its basis in the Intellectual Property Clause of the 
Constitution, which states the primary policy concern driving patent law: 
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts.19 This clause gave 
Congress the power to create the patent system, which it did in 1790.20 
Congress defined patent subject matter eligibility by listing 
categories of eligible subject matter. The four statutory categories of 
12(c) motions; and questioning “[h]ow does this happen when a patent is presumed valid? And, when 
factual issues under Rule 12 are supposed to be resolved in favor of the patentee?”). 
18. Id. (“57 of the 122 appeals of district court invalidations, received opinions from the
Federal Circuit. The rest received the dreaded ‘Rule 36 Affirmance,’ . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
19. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 37 (5th ed. 2016) (“Congressional power to establish
a patent system derives from the Intellectual Property (IP) Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”); U.S. 
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries . . . .”). 
20. PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 
2017 157 (2017) (“The first U.S. patent statute was passed in 1790.”). This patent statute was one of 
the first acts of the First Congress, demonstrating the importance of the patent system. Id. 
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patentable subject matter first appeared in the Patent Act of 1793.21 The 
original four categories were any “art, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter.”22 Congress changed the word art to process in the 
Patent Act of 1952 to increase the clarity of the statute.23 Patent subject 
matter eligibility is currently codified in 35 U.S.C. § 101,24 which has 
remained unchanged since the Patent Act of 1952.25 Apart from the 
renaming of one category in the 1952 Act, the four statutory categories 
have remained consistent since 1793.26 
Given the consistency of the statutory language, changes to patent 
subject matter eligibility came through developments at common law.27 
The statutory definition of patent eligible subject matter is broad. The 
legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952 explains that “everything 
under the sun made by man” is meant to be patent eligible subject matter.28 
The courts have narrowed this definition by creating judicial exceptions 
to subject matter eligibility.29 The judicial exceptions include laws of 
nature, abstract ideas, and natural phenomena.30 Subject matter that would 
be eligible under one of the four statutory categories is not patent eligible 
if it also falls within one of the judicial exceptions.31 
As technology develops, the courts are often left with the difficult 
task of determining whether a certain innovation is patent eligible. For 
example, the fields of software and biotechnology have changed 
drastically since the Patent Act of 1952 and were not areas of innovation 
21. Brady P. Gleason, Comment, Don’t Give Up Section 101, Don’t Ever Give Up, 65 CATH.
U.L. REV. 773, 776 (2016). 
22. Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, § 1 (1793).
23. Gleason, supra note 21, at 776 n.24 (explaining that Congress replaced the term “art” with 
“process” to avoid confusion). 
24. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor . . . .”). 
25. Gleason, supra note 21, at 776 (“This language remained largely unchanged until the patent 
laws were recodified in the 1952 Patent Act.”). 
26. Id. 
27. Cf. MUELLER, supra note 19, at 40–41 (“Since 1982, the primary source of decisional
authority interpreting the patent statute and regulations is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.”). 
28. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5
(1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).  
29. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (“We have long held
that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas are not patentable.”) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
569 U.S. 676, 589 (2013)). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. (explaining that abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena are the
fundamental tools of scientific work and should not be monopolized in a way that hinders innovation). 
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in 1793. The statutory language does not give specific guidance on these 
technological areas, so the courts have.32 Judicial guidance on subject 
matter eligibility resulted in the Alice two-part test to determine subject 
matter eligibility, which is currently used by the courts and the USPTO.33 
B. The Interpretation of Subject Matter Eligibility Law by the Supreme 
Court 
1. The Supreme Court began analyzing the eligibility of software
and biotechnology during the 1970s and 1980s.
Patent subject matter eligibility issues arose with the growth of the 
software and biotechnology industries during the 1970s and 1980s. This 
led to a series of Supreme Court decisions on subject matter eligibility that 
provide a foundation for the Court’s recent eligibility decisions, 
culminating with the Alice test. 
This series began with Gottschalk v. Benson in 1972.34 The claims in 
Benson covered a method to convert binary-coded decimal numbers into 
pure binary numbers.35 The claims did not provide any application or 
hardware limitations and effectively covered all uses of the algorithm.36 
The Court articulated three lines of reasoning that would continue through 
later decisions on subject matter eligibility: scientific truths are not 
patentable because they are basic tools of scientific work;37 an algorithm 
is not patentable if the effect of the patent would preempt all use of the 
algorithm;38 and transformation of an article to a different state is a clue 
32. See id. at 216–17 (explaining that the Court gives guidance to prevent the preemption of
fundamental concepts that could hinder the development of new technology). 
33. Robert Daniel Garza, Software Patents and Pretrial Dismissal Based on Ineligibility, 24
RICH. J.L. & TECH. no. 2, at 1, 16 (2018) (“Together, these two cases prompted a major shakeup 
regarding § 101 jurisprudence. In response, the USPTO issued new subject matter eligibility 
guidelines for examiners explaining this new Alice Two Step Test.”). 
34. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
35. Id. at 64 (“They claimed a method for converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals
into pure binary numerals.”). 
36. Id. (“The claims were not limited to any particular art or technology, to any particular
apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use.”). 
37. Id. at 67 (“Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological 
work.”). 
38. Id. at 71–72 (“The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical
application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is 
affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would 
be a patent on the algorithm itself.”). 
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to patentability.39 The Court ultimately held the claimed algorithm 
unpatentable,40 and the decision ended with a call to Congress to decide 
whether computer programs should be patentable.41 
Six years later, the Supreme Court decided another patent eligibility 
case, Parker v. Flook.42 The claims in Flook were directed to a process to 
update alarm limits in catalytic conversion processes.43 The Court 
reasoned that, during the eligibility analysis, the algorithm should be 
considered well-known and that further inventive application of the 
algorithm is required for patentability.44 The claims in Flook failed to 
meet this standard and were not eligible for patenting.45 
In 1980, the Court decided a biotechnology case, Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty.46 The inventor claimed a self-replicating bacterium that he 
genetically engineered to break down crude oil, making the organism 
useful to disperse oil spills.47 The Court took a broad view of patentability, 
noting that “Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include 
anything under the sun that is made by man.’”48 The modified bacterium 
was not naturally occurring and was a manufacture of the inventor; 
therefore, the claims were eligible.49 
39. Id. at 70 (“Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the
clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.”). 
40. Id. at 73 (reversing the lower court’s decision of eligibility).
41. Id. (“If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are raised which only
committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers of investigation are needed, including hearings 
which canvass the wide variety of views which those operating in this field entertain. The 
technological problems tendered in the many briefs before us indicate to us that considered action by 
the Congress is needed.”) (citations omitted). 
42. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
43. Id. at 586 (“The patent claims cover any use of respondent’s formula for updating the value 
of an alarm limit on any process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical 
conversion of hydrocarbons.”). 
44. Id. at 594–95 (“Respondent’s application simply provides a new and presumably better
method for calculating alarm limit values. If we assume that that method was also known, as we must 
under the reasoning in Morse, then respondent’s claim is, in effect, comparable to a claim that the 
formula 2pir can be usefully applied in determining the circumference of a wheel.”). 
45. Id. 
46. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
47. Id. at 305 (“This human-made, genetically engineered bacterium is capable of breaking
down multiple components of crude oil. Because of this property, which is possessed by no naturally 
occurring bacteria, Chakrabarty’s invention is believed to have significant value for the treatment of 
oil spills.”). 
48. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). 
49. Id. at 310 (“Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly
different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. 
His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject 
matter . . . .”). 
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After the broad interpretation of eligibility in Chakrabarty, the 
Supreme Court decided Diamond v. Diehr, another case involving an 
algorithm.50 However, the Court found the claims in Diehr eligible for 
patenting.51 The claims were directed to a method for curing synthetic 
rubber where the cure time was constantly updated using the Arrhenius 
equation and the temperature inside the mold.52 The Court reasoned that 
a process does not automatically become ineligible because it uses an 
algorithm or computer.53 The Court distinguished the claims in Diehr 
from those in Benson and Flook, noting that the claims were directed to a 
specific application of an algorithm and did not preempt all use of that 
algorithm.54 
2. The Supreme Court began narrowing the scope of subject
matter eligibility in Bilski v. Kappos.
The Supreme Court did not decide another subject matter eligibility 
case until Bilski v. Kappos in 2010.55 In the intervening period, the 
decisions in Charkabarty and Diehr lead to broad interpretation of subject 
matter eligibility.56 Business methods began enjoying patent protection, 
sparking debate in the patent community about how broad subject matter 
eligibility should be.57 With Bilski, the pendulum began to swing back 
toward a narrow interpretation of subject matter eligibility. 
50. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
51. Id. at 192–93 (“Because we do not view respondents’ claims as an attempt to patent a
mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber 
products, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.”). 
52. Id. at 178 (“Respondents characterize their contribution to the art to reside in the process
of constantly measuring the actual temperature inside the mold. These temperature measurements are 
then automatically fed into a computer which repeatedly recalculates the cure time by use of the 
Arrhenius equation.”). 
53. Id. at 187 (“[A] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become
nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital 
computer.”). 
54. Id. (“In contrast, the respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula.
Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber.”). 
55. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
56. Gleason, supra note 21, at 780 (“[T]he Federal Circuit, relying heavily on the language of
the Diehr opinion, broadened the scope of § 101.”). 
57. Id. (“[T]he Federal Circuit determined that the exception for business method claims,
which were considered previously patent-ineligible subject matter, had met its demise.”) (citing State 
St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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The claims in Bilski were directed to a business method for hedging 
against risk of price fluctuation in the commodities markets.58 The Federal 
Circuit developed the machine-or-transformation test to determine 
eligibility, based on the decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.59 The 
Supreme Court rejected the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test 
for patent subject matter eligibility, stating that it is a useful clue for 
eligibility but not dispositive.60 While business methods can be eligible 
for patenting,61 the claims in Bilski were not patent eligible.62 The 
Supreme Court did not articulate a test to replace the machine-or-
transformation test. Instead, they pointed the lower courts to the 
guideposts of Benson, Flook, and Diehr.63 
3. The Supreme Court introduced the two-part eligibility test in
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories.
The lack of new guidance on how to determine eligibility in Bilski 
allowed the debate about the breadth of subject matter eligibility to 
continue.64 As a result, district courts and the Federal Circuit struggled to 
consistently apply the principles outlined in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.65 
The uncertainty about the standard for subject matter eligibility lead the 
58. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 599 (“Petitioners’ application seeks patent protection for a claimed
invention that explains how buyers and sellers of commodities in the energy market can protect, or 
hedge, against the risk of price changes.”). 
59. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that under the machine-or-
transformation test “[a] claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.”). 
60. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604 (“This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-or-
transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some 
claimed inventions are processes under § 101. The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test 
for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”). 
61. Id. at 609 (“[T]he Patent Act leaves open the possibility that there are at least some
processes that can be fairly described as business methods that are within patentable subject matter 
under § 101.”). 
62. Id. at 612 (“The patent application here can be rejected under our precedents on the 
unpatentability of abstract ideas.”). 
63. Id. (“The Court, therefore, need not define further what constitutes a patentable ‘process,’ 
beyond pointing to the definition of that term provided in § 100(b) and looking to the guideposts in 
Benson, Flook, and Diehr.”). 
64. Gleason, supra note 21, at 782 (“The Bilski Court’s rejection of a bright line rule and its
heavy reliance on cases from the 1970s and 1980s revitalized the § 101 debate.”). 
65. Id. at 782–83 (“With no ascertainable framework, scattered opinions from different
jurisdictions continued to challenge the Federal Circuit’s understanding of the overall purpose of 
§ 101.”). 
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Supreme Court to develop a two-part test for determining eligibility in 
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories.66 
Prometheus held patents on a method for increasing the efficacy of 
thiopurine drugs.67 When a patient ingests a thiopurine drug, the patient 
metabolizes the drug, and certain metabolites become present in the 
patient’s bloodstream.68 The claimed method comprised steps of 
administering a thiopurine drug, measuring the level of metabolites in the 
patient’s blood, and adjusting the dosage based on the level of metabolites 
in the patient’s blood.69 
Prometheus sold diagnostic tests based on the claimed method to 
Mayo who used the tests.70 Eventually, Mayo developed a test of their 
own using a different metabolite range.71 Prometheus then sued Mayo for 
patent infringement.72 The district court decided that the claims were 
directed to ineligible subject matter on a motion for summary 
judgement.73 The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that the claim 
satisfied the machine-or-transformation test because the method results in 
the transformation of the body or blood taken from the body.74 
The Supreme Court again rejected the machine-or-transformation 
test as the sole test for patent eligibility.75 The Court’s analysis began by 
determining that the claims were directed to a law of nature—the 
relationship between dosage and metabolite levels.76 The Court then 
examined the claims to determine if they contained more than the law of 
66. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 556 U.S. 66, 75–76 (2012)
(describing the procedural history of the case in which the Federal Circuit struggled with how to apply 
the machine-or-transformation test after Bilski). 
67. Id. at 73 (“The patents before us concern the use of thiopurine drugs in the treatment of
autoimmune diseases, such as Crohn’s disease . . . .”).  
68. Id. (“When a patient ingests a thiopurine compound, his body metabolizes the drug, causing 
metabolites to form in his bloodstream.”). 
69. Id. at 74–75. 
70. Id. at 75 (“[Prometheus] sells diagnostic tests that embody the processes the patents
describe. For some time petitioners, Mayo Clinic Rochester and Mayo Collaborative Services 
(collectively Mayo), bought and used those tests.”). 
71. Id. (“Mayo announced that it intended to begin using and selling its own test—a test using 
somewhat higher metabolite levels to determine toxicity . . . .”). 
72. Id. at 75 (“Prometheus then brought this action claiming patent infringement.”). 
73. Id. at 76 (“[T]he District Court ultimately granted summary judgment in Mayo’s favor. The 
court reasoned that the patents effectively claim natural laws . . . .”). 
74. Id. (“On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed. . . . [T]he patents satisfied the Circuit’s 
‘machine or transformation test,’ . . . bringing the claims into compliance with § 101.”). 
75. Id. (“We . . . clarified that the ‘machine or transformation test’ is not a definitive test of
patent eligibility, but only an important and useful clue.”). 
76. Id. at 77 (“Prometheus’ patents set forth laws of nature—namely, relationships between
concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug 
will prove ineffective or cause harm.”). 
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nature to make the claims patent eligible.77 The Court examined Diehr, 
Flook, Bilski, and Benson to show how each affected the subject matter 
eligibility analysis.78 Ultimately, the additional limitations of 
administering the drug and determining the metabolite levels did not 
transform the claim into a patent eligible application.79 
Throughout the Mayo opinion, the Court raised policy concerns that 
must be balanced when determining patent subject matter eligibility. One 
issue is how to determine the scope of the judicial exceptions. If the scope 
is too narrow, then inventors may monopolize some fundamental building 
blocks of technology and harm innovation.80 However, all inventions rely 
on laws of nature, abstract ideas, or natural phenomena to some degree.81 
If the judicial exceptions are construed to an overly broad extent, then no 
invention would be patentable, resulting in the evisceration of the patent 
system.82 
The Court also addressed the place of subject matter eligibility in the 
overall scheme of patentability. The eligibility analysis of Mayo does 
overlap with the novelty inquiry under § 102 when evaluating whether 
additional steps are well-known, routine, or conventional.83 Since these 
analyses overlap, courts must balance these analyses to ensure that each 
is performing the function it was designed to perform: the § 101 analysis 
determining eligibility and the § 102 analysis determining novelty.84 
4. The Supreme Court established Mayo’s two-step test as the test
for subject matter eligibility in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International.
Even after the Mayo decision demonstrated the two-step analysis to 
determine patent eligibility, confusion remained about the meaning of 
77. Id. (“The question before us is whether the claims do significantly more than simply
describe these natural relations.”). 
78. See id. at 80–87 (summarizing the decisions in Diehr, Flook, Bilski, and Benson and 
applying their teachings to the present facts). 
79. Id. at 80 (“For these reasons we believe that the steps are not sufficient to transform
unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications of those regularities.”). 
80. Id. at 71 (“[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to
impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”). 
81. Id. (“For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”). 
82. Id. (“[T]oo broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent
law.”). 
83. Id. at 90 (“We recognize that, in evaluating the significance of additional steps, the § 101 
patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap.”). 
84. See id. (describing the differences between the subject matter eligibility analysis and the 
novelty and obviousness analyses including how these analyses treat laws of nature differently). 
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inventive concept and how to apply the two-part test. The Alice decision 
provided a clear definition of the test and another example of the test’s 
application for lower courts to follow. 
Alice Corp. held patents directed to mitigating settlement risk.85 The 
claimed method called for a third party to use a shadow record of debits 
and credits to an account to ensure that sufficient funds are available for 
transactions.86 The shadow accounts would be reconciled with the actual 
accounts at the end of the day.87 The patents contained method claims, 
claims to a computer configured to perform the method, and claims to a 
computer readable medium containing code to perform the method.88 
CLS Bank sought a declaratory judgement that Alice Corp.’s claims 
were invalid and not infringed.89 CLS Bank and Alice Corp. both filed 
motions for summary judgement on whether the claims were subject 
matter eligible, and the district court found the claims ineligible.90A 
Federal Circuit panel reversed the district court’s decision, finding that the 
claims were not directed to an abstract idea.91 The Federal Circuit reheard 
the case en banc and affirmed the district court’s decision.92 Several 
concurring and dissenting opinions to the en banc decision paved the way 
for Alice to go to the Supreme Court.93 
85. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 213 (2014) (“The claims at issue
relate to a computerized scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’ . . . .”). 
86. Id. (“[An] intermediary creates ‘shadow’ credit and debit records (i.e., account ledgers)
that mirror the balances in the parties’ real-world accounts at ‘exchange institutions’ (e.g., banks). 
The intermediary updates the shadow records in real time as transactions are entered, allowing ‘only 
those transactions for which the parties’ updated shadow records indicate sufficient resources to 
satisfy their mutual obligations.’”). 
87. Id. at 214 (“At the end of the day, the intermediary instructs the relevant financial
institutions to carry out the ‘permitted’ transactions in accordance with the updated shadow 
records . . . .”). 
88. Id. (“[T]he patents in suit claim (1) the foregoing method for exchanging obligations (the
method claims), (2) a computer system configured to carry out the method for exchanging obligations 
(the system claims), and (3) a computer-readable medium containing program code for performing 
the method of exchanging obligations (the media claims). All of the claims are implemented using a 
computer . . . .”). 
89. Id. (“CLS Bank filed suit against petitioner, seeking a declaratory judgment that the claims 
at issue are invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.”). 
90. Id. (“[T]he parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the asserted
claims are eligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The District Court held that all of the 
claims are patent ineligible . . . .”). 
91. Id. (“A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed,
holding that it was not ‘manifestly evident’ that petitioner’s claims are directed to an abstract idea.”). 
92. Id. (“The Federal Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacated the panel opinion, and
affirmed the judgment of the District Court . . . .”). 
93. Id. at 215 (stating that Judge Lourie wrote a concurring opinion joined by four other judges 
and Judge Rader concurred-in-part and dissented-in-part joined by Judge Moore). 
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The Supreme Court used Alice to concisely state the two-part test for 
patent subject matter eligibility. The first step of the analysis is to 
“determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-
ineligible concepts.”94 In Alice, the issue was whether the claims were 
directed to an abstract idea.95 The Court did not define the term abstract 
idea. Instead, the Court compared the claims to abstract claims from 
previous cases including Benson, Flook, and Bilski.96 Ultimately, the 
claims were directed to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement.97 
The second step of the two-part test is to “examine the elements of 
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ 
sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible 
application.”98 This transformation must be more than an instruction to 
apply the abstract idea or implement the abstract idea on a general-purpose 
computer.99 If a claim could become eligible by reciting the use of a 
computer, then the judicial exceptions would be extremely narrow and 
ineffective.100 The Court progressed through its analysis by examining 
Mayo, Benson, Flook, and Diehr.101 The claims at issue in Alice did not 
add to the abstract idea in a way that made the claims eligible for 
patenting.102 
The Alice decision echoed the policy concerns articulated in Mayo. 
The Court was concerned with promoting innovation.103 To further that 
goal, the scope of the judicial exceptions must be calibrated to an 
94. Id. at 217. 
95. See id. (examining the whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea under the first
step of the two-part test). 
96. Id. at 217–20 (referencing Benson, Flook, and Bilski and using the principles articulated in 
those decisions to analyze the present facts). 
97. Id. at 221 (“[T]he claims at issue are directed to the abstract idea of intermediated
settlement . . . .”). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 222–23 (explaining that after Flook and Diehr that implementing an abstract idea on 
a general-purpose computer does not result in a patent eligible claim). 
 100.  Id. at 224 (“[I]f that were the end of the § 101 inquiry, an applicant could claim any 
principle of the physical or social sciences by reciting a computer system configured to implement 
the relevant concept.”). 
101.  Id. at 221–24. 
 102.  Id. at 225–26 (“Instead, the claims at issue amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an 
instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic 
computer. Under our precedents, that is not ‘enough’ to transform an abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention.”) (citation omitted). 
103.  Id. at 216 (“We have ‘repeatedly emphasized this . . . concern that patent law not inhibit 
further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of’ these building blocks of human 
ingenuity.”). 
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appropriate breadth.104 If the exceptions are interpreted too narrowly, then 
fundamental building blocks of technology may be preempted.105 
However, if the exceptions are construed too broadly, then too few claims 
will be patent eligible, removing an incentive for inventors to participate 
in the patent system.106 
The Supreme Court has not given further guidance on the issue of 
patent subject matter eligibility and has denied petitions for certiorari on 
the issue.107 Instead, the Supreme Court left the Federal Circuit to further 
develop patent subject matter eligibility law within the framework of the 
Alice test. 
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S TREATMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER
ELIGIBILITY DURING RULE (12)(B)(6) AND (12)(C) MOTIONS 
A. The Changing Treatment of Rule (12)(b)(6) and 12(c) Motions at 
the Federal Circuit During the Mayo and Alice Decisions 
Subject matter eligibility was decided at the motion for summary 
judgement stage in Mayo, Myriad, and Alice.108 None of the recent 
Supreme Court decisions on subject matter eligibility were decided at the 
pleading stage of litigation or gave specific guidance on deciding subject 
matter eligibility at that stage. This is likely because subject matter 
eligibility was rarely decided on the pleadings before Alice.109 
Despite the rarity of subject matter eligibility decisions at the Rule 
12 stage before Alice, the Federal Circuit did hear subject matter eligibility 
issues decided on the pleadings while the Supreme Court was developing 
the Alice test. The Federal Circuit’s analysis of subject matter eligibility 
in Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC displays how Mayo and Alice affected 
subject matter eligibility analysis at the Rule 12 stage. 
 104.  See id. at 216–17 (explaining that there are negative consequences for interpreting the 
judicial exceptions too broadly or too narrowly). 
 105.  Id. at 216 (“We have ‘repeatedly emphasized this . . . concern that patent law not inhibit 
further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of’ these building blocks of human 
ingenuity.”). 
 106.  Id. at 217 (“At some level, ‘all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws 
of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.’”). 
 107.  See, e.g., Two-Way Media, Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 378 (2018) 
(mem.); Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016) (mem.). 
 108.  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S 208, 214 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 586 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 76 (2012). 
 109.  O’Byrne, supra note 13, at 408 (noting that the Federal Circuit stated that Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal for ineligibility would not be proper in most cases). 
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1. The first Ultramercial decision exemplifies the Federal
Circuit’s treatment of motions to dismiss for lack of eligibility
before the Mayo and Alice decisions.
Ultramercial held a patent with claims directed to providing users 
with copyrighted content in exchange for viewing an advertisement.110 
The advertiser would pay for the content so a viewer could access the 
content in exchange for viewing an advertisement.111 Ultramercial 
brought an infringement suit against Hulu, YouTube, and WildTangent.112 
Hulu and YouTube were dismissed from the case, and WildTangent filed 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion alleging that the patent was invalid under § 101.113 
The district court granted WildTangent’s motion and Ultramercial 
appealed.114 
The Federal Circuit issued its first decision in this case in 2011—
after Bilski but before Mayo. The Federal Circuit viewed § 101 as a coarse 
filter that is broadly permissive, while still subject to the judicial 
exceptions.115 The court relied on Diehr, Flook, and Benson when 
analyzing whether the claims were related to an abstract idea.116 The court 
also recognized that Bilski rejected the machine-or-transformation test as 
the sole test for eligibility.117 
The Federal Circuit gave guidance specific to analyzing subject 
matter eligibility early in litigation.118 In its analysis, the court noted that 
claim construction had not been performed and that claim construction 
 110.  Ultramerical, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The ‘545 patent 
claims a method for distributing copyrighted products (e.g., songs, movies, books) over the Internet 
where the consumer receives a copyrighted product for free in exchange for viewing an advertisement, 
and the advertiser pays for the copyrighted content.”). 
111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 1325 (“Ultramercial filed suit against Hulu, LLC (‘Hulu’), YouTube, LLC 
(‘YouTube’), and WildTangent, Inc. (‘WildTangent’) . . . .”). 
113.  Id. (“Hulu and YouTube have been dismissed from the case. WildTangent filed a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the ‘545 patent did not claim patent-eligible subject 
matter.”). 
114.  Id. (“The district court granted Wild-Tangent’s motion to dismiss. Ultramercial appeals.”). 
 115.  Id. (“[E]ligibility is a ‘coarse’ gauge of the suitability of broad subject matter categories 
for patent protection . . . .”). 
116.  Id. at 1327–29. 
117.  Id. at 1327 (“[T]he machine-or-transformation test is simply ‘a useful and important 
clue . . . for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101’ and is not ‘the 
sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”). 
118.  See id. at 1325. 
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can assist the court in determining abstractness.119 However, the court 
decided that formal claim construction was not necessary in this case.120 
The court found the claims eligible because they were directed to a 
practical application of the idea of using an advertisement as currency.121 
WildTangent petitioned for certiorari.122 The Supreme Court vacated the 
Federal Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in 
light of Mayo.123 
2. The second Ultramercial decision outlined several policy
reasons for refraining from eligibility determinations on the
pleadings.
The Federal Circuit began its second decision in Ultramercial with 
detailed guidance on deciding eligibility at the motion to dismiss stage.124 
The court emphasized that dismissal for ineligible subject matter would 
be rare and gave three lines of reasoning in support.125 First, patents are 
presumed to be valid, and invalidity must be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence.126 To succeed on an ineligibility defense on the 
pleadings, the defendant must show that the only plausible reading of the 
patent and complaint results in ineligibility when construed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.127 
Second, while the § 101 analysis is a question of law, the 
determination of eligibility often contains underlying factual issues.128 
 119.  Id. (“The district court dismissed Ultramercial’s claims for failure to claim statutory subject 
matter without formally construing the claims. . . . On many occasions, however, a definition of the 
invention via claim construction can clarify the basic character of the subject matter of the 
invention.”). 
 120.  Id. (“In this case, the subject matter at stake and its eligibility does not require claim 
construction.”). 
 121.  Id. at 1330 (“In sum, as a practical application of the general concept of advertising as 
currency and an improvement to prior art technology, the claimed invention is not ‘so manifestly 
abstract as to override the statutory language of section 101.’”). 
122.  WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 566 U.S. 1007 (2012) (mem.). 
123.  Id. 
124.  See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (examining 
considerations the court should keep in mind when examining subject matter eligibility at the pleading 
stage of litigation). 
 125.  Id. at 1338 (“[I]t will be rare that a patent infringement suit can be dismissed at the pleading 
stage for lack of patentable subject matter.”). 
 126.  Id. (“This is so because every issued patent is presumed to have been issued properly, 
absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.”). 
 127.  Id. at 1339 (“Thus, the only plausible reading of the patent must be that there is clear and 
convincing evidence of ineligibility.”). 
 128.  Id. (“[T]he analysis under § 101, while ultimately a legal determination, is rife with 
underlying factual issues.”). 
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Factual issues could include whether the claims are directed to a law of 
nature or an abstract idea; whether a claim element was routine or 
conventional; and to what extent the claim preempts the use of an abstract 
idea or law of nature.129 
Third, claim construction is often helpful when determining whether 
the claims are directed to a judicial exception.130 There is no bright line 
rule requiring claim construction before an eligibility analysis.131 
However, claims should be construed if there are factual disputes.132 If 
claims are not construed, then the court should read the claims in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff at the motion to dismiss stage.133 
After this discussion, the Federal Circuit continued with a detailed 
analysis of the current state of subject matter eligibility law and an 
analysis of whether the claim was directed to an abstract idea.134 The court 
found that Ultramercial’s claim was directed to a particular process, did 
not preempt all forms of advertising, and was not overgeneralized.135 
Therefore, the claimed invention was not directed to an abstract idea but 
to a practical application.136 
WildTangent petitioned for certiorari again.137 While that petition 
was pending, the Supreme Court decided Alice. The Supreme court 
vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further 
consideration in light of Alice.138 
129.  Id.  
 130.  Id. at 1340 (“[C]laim meaning may clarify the actual subject matter at stake in the invention 
and can enlighten, or even answer, questions about subject matter abstractness.”). 
131.  Id. at 1339 (“This court has never set forth a bright line rule requiring district courts to 
construe claims before determining subject matter eligibility.”). 
 132.  Id. (“On the other hand, if there are factual disputes, claim construction should be 
required.”). 
 133.  Id. (“It may also be feasible for the district court to choose to . . . adopt the [claim] 
construction proffered by the patentee.”).  
 134.  Id. at 1340–48 (examining Mayo and the previous eligibility decisions to determine 
whether WildTangent’s claims are eligible). 
135.  Id. at 1352–53. 
 136.  Id. at 1354 (“In sum, as a practical application of the general concept of advertising as 
currency and an improvement to prior art technology, the claimed invention is not ‘so manifestly 
abstract as to override the statutory language of section 101.’”). 
137.  WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 573 U.S. 942 (2014) (mem.). 
138.  Id. 
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3. The third Ultramercial decision shows how the Alice test
changed the Federal Circuit’s treatment of dismissals for lack
of eligibility on the pleadings.
The Federal Circuit’s third decision in the Ultramercial litigation set 
the stage for its current treatment of subject matter eligibility at the motion 
to dismiss stage. This decision omitted all the discussion warning against 
deciding eligibility at the motion to dismiss stage of the previous 
opinion.139 Instead, the court succinctly went through the Alice test.140 
Under step one, the claim was directed to an abstract idea of showing an 
advertisement before free content.141 Under step two, there was no 
inventive concept to transform the claim into an eligible application 
because the claims did not contain an inventive concept beyond what was 
well-known, routine, or conventional in the art.142 Therefore, the claim 
was ineligible.143 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice and the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Ultramercial, the Federal Circuit consistently affirmed district 
courts’ decisions of ineligibility on the pleadings.144 The Federal Circuit 
decisions exhibit an almost formulaic structure. The decisions begin with 
a summary of the technology and the claim language in question. The 
court then outlines the Alice test and the standard of review. The court 
performs the Alice test and usually ends the opinion by addressing the 
arguments of the losing side. 
Within this structure, the policy reasons for not deciding subject 
matter eligibility at the motion to dismiss stage outlined in the Federal 
139.  See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 140.  See id. at 714 (“In Alice, the Supreme Court identified a ‘framework for distinguishing 
patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.’”). 
141.  Id. at 715 (“[T]he concept embodied by the majority of the limitations describes only the 
abstract idea of showing an advertisement before delivering free content.”). 
 142.  Id. at 716 (“In sum, each of those eleven steps merely instructs the practitioner to 
implement the abstract idea with ‘routine, conventional activit[ies],’ which is insufficient to transform 
the patent-ineligible abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.”) (alteration in original). 
 143.  Id. at 717 (“Because the ‘545 patent claims are directed to no more than a patent-ineligible 
abstract idea, we conclude that the district court did not err in holding that the ‘545 patent does not 
claim patent-eligible subject matter.”). 
 144.  E.g., Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys. & Software, LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018); Secured Mail Sols., LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2017); 
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Vehicle Intelligence 
& Safety, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 635 Fed. Appx. 914, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); 
Content Extraction & Transmission, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 
2014); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 710; Addy, supra note 12 (noting that most district court decisions 
of ineligibility are on the pleadings and that most appeals of dismissals for lack of eligibility are 
affirmed by the Federal Circuit). 
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Circuit’s second Ultramercial decision carry little weight. The second 
Ultramercial decision recognized that factual issues may prevent a 
determination of eligibility at the pleading stage. However, in Vehicle 
Intelligence & Safety, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, the Federal 
Circuit characterized the issue of subject matter eligibility as a question 
of law without referencing the presence of underlying factual questions.145 
This trend continued until the decisions in Berkheimer v. HP Inc.146 and 
Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,147 in which the 
Federal Circuit clarified that the subject matter eligibility analysis does 
contain underlying factual issues. 
Ultramercial also noted that claim construction may aid in the 
eligibility determination but did not require claim construction before 
determining eligibility. Since then, the Federal Circuit has consistently 
affirmed dismissal in cases without claim construction. In FairWarning 
IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, FairWarning argued that a specific claim 
construction would root the invention in computer technology and render 
the claims eligible.148 The Federal Circuit dismissed the argument, 
reasoning that, regardless of claim construction, the invention was merely 
computer implementation of an abstract idea, which is patent ineligible.149 
When claim construction has occurred, the Federal Circuit uses that 
construction and often praises its helpfulness.150 Even though the Federal 
Circuit stated that claim construction can aid the eligibility analysis, the 
Federal Circuit has not specifically required claim construction before 
determining eligibility at the Rule 12 stage. 
 145.  Mercedes-Benz, 635 Fed. Appx. at 917 (“Because patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 
is an issue of law, we review it de novo.”). 
 146.  Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Patent eligibility under 
35 U.S.C. § 101 is ultimately an issue of law we review de novo. The patent eligibility inquiry may 
contain underlying issues of fact.”). 
 147.  Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(“While the ultimate determination of eligibility under § 101 is a question of law, like many legal 
questions, there can be subsidiary fact questions which must be resolved en route to the ultimate legal 
determination.”). 
 148.  FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1098 (describing FairWarning’s proposed construction and 
stating that “[t]he implication of this construction, FairWarning argues, would be that ‘the ‘500 patent 
is necessarily rooted in computer technology.’”). 
 149.  See id. (“Simply requiring computer implementation of an otherwise abstract-idea process, 
as FairWarning would require of the claim, does not make the claims patent eligible. Regardless of 
the resolution of this construction issue, the ‘500 patent claims patent-ineligible subject matter.”). 
 150.  See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(“As an initial matter, we note that, in this case, claim construction is helpful to resolve the question 
of patentability under § 101.”). 
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B. The Federal Circuit’s Treatment of Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c) 
Motions for Subject Matter Ineligibility After Alice 
1. The Federal Circuit reversed a dismissal for lack of eligibility
and discussed the place of eligibility determinations in
litigation.
The Federal Circuit has reversed a district court’s decision of 
ineligibility on a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c) motion only eight times since 
the Supreme Court’s Alice decision.151 The first time was in BASCOM 
Global Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC. The claims in BASCOM 
were directed to filtering internet content.152 Prior internet filters either 
resided on the internet service provider’s (ISP) server or resided on the 
computers of individual users.153 Filters on ISP servers apply one set of 
filtering rules to all users while filters on local systems are individually 
customizable but susceptible to circumvention by experienced users.154 
BASCOM’s system combined the benefits of both prior systems in a filter 
residing on an ISP’s server that was customizable for individual users.155 
BASCOM sued AT&T for infringement.156 AT&T responded with a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion arguing that the claims were invalid under 
35 U.S.C. § 101.157 The district court granted AT&T’s motion to dismiss, 
and BASCOM appealed.158 
 151.  See Endo Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019); 
Nat. Alts. Int’l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Data Engine 
Techs., LLC v. Google, LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., 
Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1122; Visual Memory, LLC v. 
NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017); McRO, 837 F.3d at 1300; BASCOM Glob. 
Internet Servs. V. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 152.  See BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1343–44 (describing the prior art filter systems and the patented 
system). 
 153.  Id. (explaining that “filtering software was first placed on local computers” and “some 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), such as ‘America Online,’ installed a filter on their remote 
servers . . . .”). 
154.  Id.  
 155.  Id. at 1344 (“The ‘606 patent describes its invention as combining the advantages of the 
then-known filtering tools while avoiding their drawbacks.”). 
156.  Id. at 1346 (“BASCOM sued AT&T Inc. for patent infringement, added AT&T Mobility 
LLC and AT&T Corp. (collectively, AT&T) as defendants, and then dismissed AT&T Inc. from the 
case.”). 
 157.  Id. (“AT&T moved to dismiss BASCOM’s complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6), on the basis 
that each claim of the ‘606 patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”). 
158.  Id. at 1346–47 (“The district court found that the claims were directed to [an] abstract 
idea . . . . The district court then determined that the limitations in combination were not inventive. . . . 
BASCOM appeals.”). 
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The Federal Circuit applied the Alice test.159 Under the first step, they 
agreed with the district court that the claims were directed to the abstract 
idea of filtering content.160 However, the Federal Circuit disagreed with 
the district court’s analysis at step two of the Alice test.161 The district 
court’s analysis mirrored an obviousness analysis too closely, looking for 
each element of the claim in the prior art.162 The Federal Circuit stressed 
that an inventive concept under Alice step two can arise from a non-
conventional arrangement of previously known pieces.163 The claims 
recited a specific implementation of the abstract idea of filtering content 
in a way that would not preclude all methods of filtering content on the 
internet.164 
With regard to determining eligibility at the pleading stage, the court 
recognized that the claims must be construed in BASCOM’s favor during 
this stage of litigation.165 BASCOM alleged the presence of an inventive 
concept that would make the claims eligible, and the court found no 
evidence on the record that would refute that allegation as a matter of 
law.166 Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal and 
remanded the case.167 
Judge Newman concurred with the decision but questioned the 
distinction between eligibility and patentability determinations.168 She 
 159.  Id. at 1347 (“[T]he Supreme Court set forth a two-step analytical framework to identify 
patents that, in essence, claim nothing more than abstract ideas.”). 
 160.  Id. at 1348 (“The claims of the ‘606 patent are directed to filtering content on the 
Internet. . . . We agree with the district court that filtering content is an abstract idea . . . .”). 
 161.  Id. at 1349 (“However, we disagree with the district court’s analysis of the ordered 
combination of limitations.”). 
 162.  Id. at 1350 (“The district court’s analysis . . . looks similar to an obviousness analysis under 
35 U.S.C. § 103, except lacking an explanation of a reason to combine the limitations as claimed. The 
inventive concept inquiry requires more than recognizing that each claim element, by itself, was 
known in the art.”). 
 163.  Id. (“[A]n inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic 
arrangement of known, conventional pieces.”). 
 164.  Id. (“The claims do not merely recite the abstract idea of filtering content along with the 
requirement to perform it on the Internet, or to perform it on a set of generic computer components. . . . 
Nor do the claims preempt all ways of filtering content on the Internet. . . .”). 
 165.  Id. at 1352 (“[C]onstrued in favor of BASCOM as they must be in this procedural posture, 
the claims of the ‘606 patent do not preempt the use of the abstract idea of filtering content on the 
Internet . . . .”). 
 166.  Id. (“BASCOM has alleged that an inventive concept can be found in the ordered 
combination of claim limitations that transform the abstract idea of filtering content into a particular, 
practical application of that abstract idea. We find nothing on this record that refutes those allegations 
as a matter of law or justifies dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).”). 
 167.  Id. (“We therefore vacate the district court’s order granting AT&T’s motion to dismiss 
under FRCP 12(b)(6) and remand so that the case may proceed.”). 
 168.  Id. at 1352–55 (Newman, J., concurring) (writing separately to question deciding eligibility 
followed by patentability). 
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noted that, when eligibility issues arise, the courts usually first decide 
eligibility then decide patentability.169 Separate eligibility and 
patentability determinations are cumbersome, use additional judicial 
resources, and do not take advantage of the overlap in analysis between 
eligibility and patentability.170 Also, if the court decides a claim is 
unpatentable, then the eligibility issue is moot.171 Given the overlap 
between the eligibility analysis and various patentability analyses, Judge 
Newman proposed determining patentability in response to an allegation 
that a claim is directed toward an abstract idea.172 
2. The Federal Circuit reversed two decisions of ineligibility
without additional guidance on making eligibility
determinations on the pleadings.
The Federal Circuit also reversed a district court finding of 
ineligibility in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.173 The 
claims in McRO were directed toward a method for efficient lip 
synchronization and manipulation of character facial expressions in 
computer animated characters.174 McRO filed an infringement suit against 
several video game developers and publishers.175 The Central District of 
California consolidated several of the cases and proceeded with claim 
construction.176 Then, the defendants moved for judgement on the 
169.  Id. at 1353 (Newman, J., concurring). 
 170.  Id. at 1352 (Newman, J., concurring) (“[T]hese cumbersome procedures for separate 
determinations of patent eligibility and patentability have added to the cost and uncertainty of patent-
supported commerce, with no balancing benefit.”). 
171.  Id. at 1355 (Newman, J., concurring) (“If the claims are unpatentable, any issue of 
abstractness, however defined, is mooted.”). 
 172.  Id. at 1353 (Newman, J., concurring) (“I propose returning to the letter of Section 101, 
where eligibility is recognized for ‘any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter.’ It follows that if any of these classes is claimed so broadly or vaguely or improperly as to 
be deemed an ‘abstract idea,’ this could be resolved on application of the requirements and conditions 
of patentability.”). 
173.  McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 174.  Id. at 1307 (“[I]t is the primary object of this invention to provide a method for 
automatically . . . producing accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in 
animated characters.”). 
175.  Id. at 1308 (“McRO, Inc., d/b/a Planet Blue (‘McRO’) filed lawsuits in the U.S. District 
Courts for the Central District of California and for the District of Delaware. The defendants are 
generally video game developers and publishers.”). 
 176.  Id. (“The Central District of California (‘district court’) consolidated the proceedings there 
for pre-trial purposes on two tracks. It held a claim construction hearing the Track 1 cases . . . .”). 
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pleadings under Rule 12(c).177 The district court found the claims 
ineligible, and McRO appealed.178 
The Federal Circuit proceeded through the Alice test and disagreed 
with the district court at step one.179 McRO argued that, under Diehr, the 
claims were not directed toward an abstract idea, and the defendants 
argued that the claims were ineligible under Flook, because they were 
directed to unpatentable algorithms.180 The Federal Circuit decided that 
the claims were directed to a subset of methods for animating characters 
and that the claimed method would not preempt every process in that 
category.181 The method was also distinct from the method used by human 
animators to achieve lip-synchronization.182 The claimed process 
improved existing animation technology; therefore, it was not directed to 
an abstract idea.183 Since the claim was not directed to an abstract idea, 
the court did not examine Alice step two.184 While McRO is one of the few 
cases in which the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s decision of 
ineligibility on the pleadings, the Federal Circuit did not give additional 
guidance on deciding eligibility on the pleadings. 
Visual Memory, LLC v. NVIDIA Corp. was the third case in which 
the Federal Circuit found claims dismissed on the pleadings to be patent 
eligible.185 In this case, the claim at issue was not directed to a method but 
to a computer memory system.186 Visual Memory sued NVIDIA for 
infringement of the memory system, and NVIDIA moved to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6).187 The district court found the claim directed to the abstract 
 177.  Id. (“On July 10, 2014, all Central District of California defendants . . . jointly filed a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings that the asserted claims were directed to patent ineligible subject 
matter under § 101.”). 
178.  Id. at 1309 (“The district court entered judgment against McRO . . . . McRO appeals.”). 
 179.  Id. at 1313 (disagreeing with the district court that the claims were directed to an abstract 
idea). 
180.  Id. at 1309–10. 
181.  Id. at 1313–15. 
182.  Id. at 1314 (explaining how a human animator would not follow the steps of the claimed 
algorithm). 
 183.  Id. at 1316 (“[C]laim 1 is directed to a patentable, technological improvement over the 
existing, manual 3-D animation techniques.”). 
 184.  Id. (“Because we find that claim 1 is not directed to ineligible subject matter, we do not 
reach Alice step two.”). 
185.  Visual Memory, LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  
 186.  Id. (“The ‘740 patent purports to overcome these deficiencies by creating a memory system 
with programmable operational characteristics that can be tailored for use with multiple different 
processors without the accompanying reduction in performance.”). 
187.  Id. at 1257 (“Visual Memory sued NVIDIA for infringement of the ‘740 patent. Believing 
the claims to be directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, NVIDIA filed a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 
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idea of categorical data storage with no additional inventive concept and 
dismissed the case. Visual Memory appealed.188 
The Federal Circuit focused on the Alice test and again gave no 
specific guidance on deciding eligibility at the pleading stage. Under Alice 
step one, the court found that the claim was not directed to an abstract idea 
because it provided an improvement to the functioning of a computer.189 
Judge Hughes dissented and would have found the claim ineligible.190 
Under Alice step one, the claim was directed to the abstract idea of 
categorical data storage, and the claim did not contain an inventive 
concept under Alice step two when the claim referred only to generic 
computer components.191 
C. The Federal Circuit decided that factual allegations may prevent 
dismissal for lack of subject matter eligibility at the pleading stage. 
1. The Federal Circuit reversed a dismissal for lack of eligibility
and allowed a party to amend its complaint to make additional
factual allegations favoring eligibility.
The fourth case in which the Federal Circuit reversed a district 
court’s dismissal for ineligibility on the pleadings is Aatrix Software Inc. 
v. Green Shades Software, Inc.192 Aatrix and its sister case Berkheimer v.
HP Inc. are notable for recognizing that the subject matter eligibility 
analysis is a question of law with underlying questions of fact.193 While 
this characterization was not new to subject matter eligibility law, it had 
 188.  Id. (“The district court granted NVIDIA’s motion. . . . Visual Memory appeals the district 
court’s decision.”). 
 189.  Id. at 1262 (explaining that using conventional components is not fatal to patent eligibility 
when improvements are made to the functioning of the computer). 
 190.  Id. (Hughes, J., dissenting) (“I would find the ‘740 claims are directed to the abstract idea 
of categorical data storage. At step two of Alice, I would find the claims fail to recite any inventive 
concepts sufficient to transform themselves into a patent-eligible application. Thus, I believe the ‘740 
claims are ineligible under § 101 . . . .”). 
191.  Id. (Hughes, J., dissenting). 
 192.  Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(“[W]e vacate the district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and reverse its denial of Aatrix’s 
motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.”). 
193.  Meredith Addy, Is there a Light at the End of the Alice Tunnel?, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 18, 
2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/18/light-end-alice-tunnel/id=93883/ [https://perma.cc/
N83R-9YFB] (stating that by recognizing factual components of the eligibility analysis, “Aatrix, and 
Bernheimer depart from the Court’s post-Alice precedent.”). 
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not appeared in a Federal Circuit decision since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Alice.194 
The claims in Aatrix were directed to a system for designing, 
creating, and importing data into a viewable form.195 Aatrix sued Green 
Shades for infringement of two of its patents.196 Green Shades filed a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that all the claims were 
ineligible.197 Aatrix argued against dismissal so that claim construction 
could proceed and moved to amend its complaint.198 The district court 
granted Green Shades’ motion to dismiss and did not allow Aatrix to 
amend its complaint.199 Aatrix appealed to the Federal Circuit.200 
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by affirming that “patent 
eligibility can be determined at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage” of litigation.201 
The Federal Circuit then discussed a limitation on that rule, stating that 
dismissal is only appropriate when there are no factual allegations that 
would prevent resolving an eligibility issue as a matter of law.202 Subject 
matter eligibility is a question of law with underlying questions of fact, 
and the question of whether claim elements are routine or conventional is 
a question of fact.203 At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the allegations in the 
complaint, patent, and material subject to judicial notice must be viewed 
in a light favorable to the patentee.204 The Federal Circuit determined that 
the district court should have denied Green Shades’ motion to dismiss and 
 194.  See Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1363–64 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps the single most consistent factor in this court’s 
§ 101 law has been our precedent that the § 101 inquiry is a question of law.”).
 195.  Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1123 (“The ‘615 and the ‘393 patents . . . are directed to systems and 
methods for designing, creating, and importing data into a viewable form on a computer so that a user 
can manipulate the form data and create viewable forms and reports.”). 
 196.  Id. at 1124 (“Aatrix sued Green Shades Software, Inc. (‘Green Shades’) for infringement 
of the ‘615 and ‘393 patents.”). 
 197.  Id. (“Green Shades moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). It argued all 
claims in the asserted patents were ineligible under § 101.”). 
 198.  Id. (“Aatrix argued the motion should be denied ‘to permit claim construction to go forward 
and for the [district court] to acquaint itself with the actual inventions.’”). 
199.  Id. (“The district court granted Green Shades’ motion and held every claim ineligible under 
§ 101. . . . Aatrix moved to . . . amend the complaint. . . . The district court denied these
motions . . . .”). 
200.  Id. (“Aatrix timely appealed.”). 
 201.  Id. at 1125 (“We have held that patent eligibility can be determined at the Rule 12(b)(6) 
stage.”). 
202.  Id. (“This is true only when there are no factual allegations that, taken as true, prevent 
resolving the eligibility question as a matter of law.”). 
 203.  Id. at 1128 (“Whether the claim elements or the claimed combination are well-understood, 
routine, conventional is a question of fact.”). 
 204.  Id. (“And in this case, that question cannot be answered adversely to the patentee based on 
the sources properly considered on a motion to dismiss, such as the complaint, the patent, and 
materials subject to judicial notice.”). 
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allowed Aatrix to amend its complaint because the amended complaint 
raised factual issues that would have prevented the conclusion that the 
claim elements were well-understood, routine, or conventional under the 
second step of the Alice test.205 Therefore, the Federal Circuit vacated and 
remanded the district court’s dismissal.206 
Judge Reyna wrote an opinion concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-
part.207 He agreed with the decision to vacate and remand the case.208 
However, he disagreed with the emphasis that the majority placed on the 
underlying factual questions of subject matter eligibility.209 He noted that 
there is precedent for subject matter eligibility being a pure question of 
law.210 He also argued that this decision may make it easier for plaintiffs 
to avoid motions to dismiss by amending their complaints to contain 
factual allegations that must be taken as true.211 
2. The Federal Circuit decided not to rehear Aatrix en banc,
sparking discussion about the state of subject matter eligibility
jurisprudence.
Green Shades petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which the Federal 
Circuit denied.212 The denial came with two concurring opinions and one 
dissent. In his concurrence, Judge Moore recognized that every type of 
validity challenge is either entirely factual or contains underlying factual 
issues.213 The Supreme Court recognized that the eligibility analysis 
 205.  Id. at 1126 (“The proposed second amended complaint contains allegations that, taken as 
true, would directly affect the district court’s patent eligibility analysis. These allegations at a 
minimum raise factual disputes underlying the § 101 analysis, such as whether the claim term ‘data 
file’ constitutes an inventive concept, . . . sufficient to survive an Alice/Mayo analysis at the Rule 
12(b)(6) stage.”). 
 206.  Id. at 1130 (“For the foregoing reasons we vacate the district court’s dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) and reverse its denial of Aatrix’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.”). 
207.  Id. (Reyna, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part). 
 208.  Id. (Reyna, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (“I concur with the majority’s 
decision to vacate and remand to the district court on the motion to dismiss.”). 
209.  Id. (Reyna, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (“[T]he majority opinion attempts 
to shoehorn a significant factual component into the Alice § 101 analysis.”). 
210.  Id. (Reyna, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (“Our precedent is clear that the 
§ 101 inquiry is a legal question.”). 
 211.  Id. at 1130 (Reyna, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (“One effect of this 
approach is that a plaintiff facing a 12(b)(6) motion may simply amend its complaint to allege 
extrinsic facts that, once alleged, must be taken as true, regardless of its consistency with the intrinsic 
record.”). 
 212.  Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(en banc) (per curiam). 
 213.  Id. at 1355–56 (Moore, J., concurring) (“Every other type of validity challenge is either 
entirely factual (e.g., anticipation, written description, utility), a question of law with underlying facts 
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would overlap with the novelty analysis—an analysis that is factual in 
nature—implying that the eligibility analysis involves factual 
determinations.214 When factual questions arise, they must be treated 
appropriately according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: on a 
motion to dismiss, the court must determine if the complaint states a claim 
for relief when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.215 
Judge Lourie wrote a separate concurrence questioning the current 
subject matter eligibility analysis.216 He gave an overview of how subject 
matter eligibility became a complex, multi-step analysis and questioned 
why a two-step test is necessary to determine whether an idea is 
abstract.217 He advocated for changes to subject matter eligibility law by 
congressional intervention and noted that an en banc decision in this case 
would not resolve the problems of the current subject matter eligibility 
analysis.218 
Judge Reyna again dissented. He disagreed with the emphasis placed 
on the factual portion of the eligibility analysis, arguing that eligibility is 
a question of law.219 The subject matter eligibility analysis is focused on 
the claims.220 Claim construction is a question of law, so subject matter 
eligibility should also be primarily a question of law.221 He advocated for 
determining eligibility based on the information within the four corners 
(e.g., obviousness, enablement), or a question of law that may contain underlying facts (e.g., 
indefiniteness).”). 
 214.  Id. at 1356 (Moore, J., concurring) (“Indeed, the Court recognized that ‘in evaluating the 
significance of additional steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry 
might sometimes overlap.’ ‘[C]ase law from the Supreme Court and this court has stated for decades 
that anticipation is a factual question.’”) (citation omitted). 
 215.  Id. at 1357 (Moore, J., concurring) (“If patent eligibility is challenged in a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we must apply the well-settled Rule 
12(b)(6) standard which is consistently applied in every area of law.”). 
216.  Id. at 1360 (Lourie, J., concurring) (stating that many in the innovation field consider the 
§ 101 analysis to have problems).
 217.  Id. at 1360–61 (Lourie, J., concurring) (describing the broad statutory basis of eligibility 
and how the courts have narrowed it).  
 218.  Id. at 1361–62 (Lourie, J., concurring) (“I concur in the decision of the court not to rehear 
this § 101 case en banc. . . . [I]t would not work us out of the current § 101 dilemma. . . . Resolution 
of patent-eligibility issues requires higher intervention . . . .”). 
 219.  Id. at 1362 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“Aatrix and Berkheimer alter the § 101 analysis in a 
significant and fundamental manner by presenting patent eligibility under § 101 as predominately a 
question of fact.”). 
 220.  Id. at 1364 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s treatment of the ‘inventive concept’ search 
at step two makes clear that this inquiry is predominately a legal question focused on the claims.”). 
 221.  Id. at 1367 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“When construing patent claims, the court may rely on 
factual findings in some instances, but predominately construes the terms according to the claims and 
specification, i.e., a purely legal determination.”). 
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of the patent when possible and viewing extrinsic evidence rarely, similar 
to claim construction and contract interpretation.222 
The decisions in Aatrix and Berkheimer were initially praised by 
members of the patent community who hoped for fewer dismissals.223 
Since these cases issued, the Federal Circuit has consistently cited them 
for the proposition that the subject matter eligibility analysis contains 
underlying questions of fact.224 In theory, this standard should reduce the 
number of claims dismissed on the pleadings. However, outcomes since 
the decisions in Aatrix and Berkheimer have still leaned toward 
dismissal.225 
D. The Federal Circuit’s Treatment of Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c) 
Motions for Subject Matter Ineligibility after Aatrix 
1. The Federal Circuit has continued affirming dismissals for lack
of subject matter eligibility after Aatrix.
The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of subject matter 
eligibility in eight opinions after the Aatrix decision.226 This string of 
dismissals tempered the optimism of some members of the patent 
community and gave the impression that Aatrix would be applied 
narrowly.227 The decision in Interval Licensing, LLC v. AOL, Inc. sparked 
 222.  Id. at 1368 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“Accordingly, just as in claim construction and contract 
interpretation, looking beyond the four corners of the patent should only occur in exceptional 
circumstances.”). 
 223.  Addy, supra note 193 (“Maybe I’m being too optimistic. But in a pair of decisions issued 
within a week of each other, Berkheimer v. HP and Aatrix Software v. Green Shades, the Federal 
Circuit just vacated two patent ineligibility determinations. . . . This comes as more than a relief.”). 
 224.  See SAP Am., Inc. v. Investpic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Interval 
Licensing, LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  
 225.  See ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 763 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Voit 
Techs., LLC v. Del-Ton, Inc., 757 Fed. Appx. 1000, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Athena Diagnostics, Inc. 
v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743, 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Glasswall Sols., Ltd. v.
Clearswift, Ltd., 754 Fed. Appx. 996, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Data Engine Techs., LLC v. Google, LLC, 
906 F.3d 999, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Interval Licensing, 896 F.3d at 1336; Burnett v. Panasonic Corp., 
741 Fed. Appx. 777, 778 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (per curiam); SAP, 890 F.3d at 1016; Voter Verified, Inc. 
v. Election Sys. & Software, LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
226.  ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 763; Voit Techs., 757 Fed. Appx. at 1000; Athena, 915 F.3d at
743; Glasswall, 754 Fed. Appx. at 997 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Interval Licensing, 896 F.3d at 1336; Burnett, 
741 Fed. Appx. at 777; SAP, 890 F.3d at 1018; Voter Verified, 887 F.3d at 1379. 
227.  Burman York Mathis III, No Light at the End of the Tunnel, Not Even Close, IPWATCHDOG 
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/08/01/no-light-at-the-end-of-the-
tunnel/id=99473/ [https://perma.cc/K8KB-SCHA] (responding to Ms. Addy’s optimistic article 
(supra note 193) about Aatrix and Berkheimer saying, “Five months later, it is clear that Ms. Addy 
was too optimistic.”). 
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an opinion from Judge Plager concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part.228 
Judge Plager agreed with the decision to affirm the district court’s 
dismissal of the case under the current subject matter eligibility 
framework.229 However, he criticized the current state of subject matter 
eligibility law, especially the lack of definition for the term abstract idea 
and the inclusion of a search for an inventive concept.230 He advocated for 
intervention from the Supreme Court or Congress.231 But, realizing that 
that intervention is unlikely to come quickly, he suggested that the district 
courts postpone deciding eligibility until they examine other patentability 
issues.232 
2. The Federal Circuit has reversed dismissals for lack of subject
matter eligibility in five cases after the Aatrix decision.
After the Aatrix decision, the Federal Circuit found dismissed claims 
eligible in five cases.233 In Data Engine Techs., LLC v. Google, LLC., the 
claims related to a spreadsheet system with tabs for identifying various 
spreadsheet pages.234 Data Engine Technologies (DET) brought an 
infringement suit against Google for infringing three of its patents.235 
Google moved for judgement on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and the 
228.  Interval Licensing, 896 F.3d at 1348 (Plager, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part). 
 229.  Id. (Plager, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (“I concur in the carefully 
reasoned opinion by my colleagues in the majority, even though the state of the law is such as to give 
little confidence that the outcome is necessarily correct.”). 
230.  Id. at 1349–53 (Plager, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (noting that the Court 
has never defined the term abstract idea, relying on precedent to decide abstractness, and explaining 
that the concept of an inventive requirement was replaced with the concept of non-obviousness in 
§ 103). 
 231.  Id. at 1355–56 (Plager, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has little incentive to hear another patent subject matter eligibility case and that a 
legislative fix, while possible, is unlikely to come quickly). 
 232.  Id. at 1355 (Plager, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (“[A] district court in an 
appropriate case might choose to exercise control over its docket by instructing a defendant who raises 
an ‘abstract ideas’ § 101 defense that the court will defer addressing that defense until first having the 
issues in §§ 102, 103, and 112 addressed.”). 
 233.  See Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Nat. Alts. Int’l, 
Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Data Engine Techs., LLC v. Google, LLC, 
906 F.3d 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Ancora Techs. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1343 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018). 
 234.  Data Engine, 906 F.3d at 1003 (“[T]he Tab Patents are directed to and claim a method of 
implementing a notebook-tabbed interface, which allows users to easily navigate through three-
dimensional electronic spreadsheets.”). 
 235.  Id. at 1005–06 (giving an exemplary claim from the Tab Patents and the ‘146 patent and 
stating that DET alleged infringement of claims from these patents). 
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district court dismissed the case.236 The Federal Circuit performed the 
Alice test on claims from each patent.237 One of the claims was eligible 
because it was not directed to an abstract idea but to a method for 
navigating spreadsheets that improved computer spreadsheet 
functionality.238 Other claims were directed to abstract ideas of storing 
electronic spreadsheet pages and storing information about changes to 
spreadsheet data.239 Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, 
reversed-in-part, and remanded the decision to the district court.240 
The next decision in which the Federal Circuit found eligible claims 
is Ancora Techs. v. HTC Am., Inc.241 The claims were directed to a method 
for restricting the use of unauthorized software on a computer.242 Ancora 
filed an action against HTC for patent infringement and HTC moved to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).243 The district court dismissed the case.244 
Under the first step of the Alice test, the Federal Circuit decided that the 
claims were not directed to an abstract idea.245 The claims were directed 
to a specific method for preventing unauthorized use of a program that 
provided a computer functionality improvement.246 Therefore, the claims 
were eligible, and the Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district 
court.247 
After Ancora Techs., the Federal Circuit found eligible claims in 
three cases: Natural Alternatives International, Inc. v. Creative 
 236.  Id. at 1006 (“Google filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(c), arguing that the asserted claims of the Tab Patents and the ‘146 patent are 
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under § 101.”). 
237.  See id. at 1007–13. 
 238.  Id. at 1011 (“[W]hen read as a whole, in light of the specification, claim 12 is directed to 
more than a generic or abstract idea as it claims a particular manner of navigating three-dimensional 
spreadsheets, implementing an improvement in electronic spreadsheet functionality.”). 
239.  Id. at 1011–13 (explaining that claim 1 of the ‘551 patent and the claims of the ‘146 patent 
were ineligible). 
240.  Id. at 1013. 
 241.  Ancora Techs. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[W]e conclude[] 
the claims at issue here are not directed to ineligible subject matter.”). 
242.  Id. at 1344–45 (describing the state of the prior art, the asserted invention, and giving a 
representative claim, claim 1 of the ‘941 patent). 
 243.  Id. at 1344 (“Ancora brought this action against HTC America and HTC Corporation in 
2016, alleging infringement of the ‘941 patent. HTC moved to dismiss on the ground that the patent’s 
claims are invalid because their subject matter is ineligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”). 
244.  Id. at 1346. 
 245.  Id. at 1348 (“[W]e conclude that claim 1 of the ‘941 patent is not directed to an abstract 
idea. Improving security . . . can be a non-abstract computer-functionality improvement if done by a 
specific technique that departs from earlier approaches to solve a specific computer problem.”). 
246.  Id.  
247.  Id. at 1350 (“[W]e hold that HTC has not shown the ‘941 patent’s claims to be invalid 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”). 
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Compounds, LLC, Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals 
USA, Inc., and Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.248 In Natural Alternatives 
International and Endo Pharmaceuticals, the Federal Circuit decided that 
the inventions were not related to patent ineligible subject matter under 
step one of the Alice test.249 In Cellspin Soft, the claims were related to an 
abstract idea under step one of the Alice test, but Cellspin’s complaint 
contained allegations that aspects of the claimed invention were not 
conventional.250 Therefore, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s 
dismissal.251 
As of the time of writing, Cellspin Soft is the most recent case in 
which the Federal Circuit reversed a dismissal of a case for lack of patent 
subject matter eligibility.252 The next section provides an analysis of the 
Federal Circuit’s treatment of Rule 12 motions to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter eligibility. The section discusses the impact of an invalidity 
ruling on the patentee; the consistency of the Federal Circuit’s treatment 
of the Alice test with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and the ability 
of a court to apply the Alice test in a satisfactory manner at the pleading 
stage of litigation. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S TREATMENT OF ELIGIBILITY
DECISIONS ON THE PLEADINGS AND RECOMMENDATION THAT THE 
248.  Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Endo Pharm. Inc. 
v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Nat. Alts. Int’l, Inc. v. Creative
Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2019).  
 249.  Nat. Alts., 918 F.3d at 1350 (“The claims at issue are not directed to ineligible subject 
matter under step one of the Alice test.”); Endo Pharm., 919 F.3d at 1357 (“The claims in this case 
are directed to a new treatment for an ailment, albeit using a natural law or phenomenon. The claims 
are not directed to the ineligible subject matter itself and, as such, are eligible.”). 
 250.  Cellspin 927 F.3d at 1316 (“Having concluded that the claims are directed to an abstract 
idea, we next consider whether the claimed elements—’individually and as an ordered 
combination’—recite an inventive concept. . . . Cellspin’s allegations identify several ways in which 
its application of capturing, transferring, and publishing data was unconventional.”). 
251.  Id. at 1320 (“We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal . . . .”). 
252.  After the initial writing of this article, the Federal Circuit issued the opinion MyMail, Ltd. 
v. ooVoo, LLC. In MyMail, the Federal Circuit concluded that “the district court erred by failing to
address the parties’ claim construction dispute before concluding, on a Rule 12(c) motion, that the 
MyMail patents are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under § 101.” MyMail, Ltd. v. ooVoo, 
LLC, 934 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Federal Circuit refrained from deciding eligibility 
and remanded the case to the district court. Id. The MyMail decision is not discussed further in this 
article.  
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT DISCOURAGE EARLY DISMISSALS FOR LACK OF 
ELIGIBILITY 
A. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Mayo and Alice disrupted The 
Federal Circuit’s treatment of Subject Matter Eligibility at the Rule 
12 Stage. 
1. The litigation in Ultramercial displays how the two-part
eligibility test changed the way the Federal Circuit examines
eligibility on the pleadings.
Before the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mayo and Alice, motions to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter eligibility were rare.253 As displayed in 
Ultramercial, Federal Circuit guidance discouraged Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions for lack of subject matter eligibility.254 The Federal Circuit 
considered subject matter eligibility to be a question of law with 
underlying factual issues.255 These factual issues include whether 
something is conventional in the art and the scope of preemption.256 Given 
the factual issues surrounding patent eligibility and the clear and 
convincing evidence standard for proving invalidity, the Federal Circuit 
considered dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) improper under normal 
circumstances.257 
In Ultramercial, the Federal Circuit also stated that claim 
construction was not always necessary before determining subject matter 
eligibility.258 The Federal Circuit’s guidance gave district courts several 
options on how to proceed, including using the patentee’s construction, 
adopting the construction most favorable to the patentee, and going 
through a full claim construction procedure before making a decision.259 
For the defendant to prevail at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the claims must be 
 253.  O’Byrne, supra note 13, at 408 (noting that the Federal Circuit stated that Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal for ineligibility would not be proper in most cases). 
 254.  Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal for lack of eligible subject matter will be the exception, not the rule.”). 
 255.  Id. (“[T]he analysis under § 101, while ultimately a legal determination, is rife with 
underlying factual issues.”). 
 256.  Id. (“Almost by definition, analyzing whether something was ‘conventional’ or ‘routine’ 
involves analyzing facts. Likewise, any inquiry into the scope of preemption—how much of the field 
is ‘tied up’ by the claim—by definition will involve historic facts: . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 257.  Id. (“The presence of factual issues coupled with the requirement for clear and convincing 
evidence normally will render dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) improper.”). 
258.  Id. (“[C]laim construction may not always be necessary for a § 101 analysis.”). 
 259.  Id. (“It may also be feasible for the district court to choose to construe the claims in 
accordance with this court’s precedent, or to adopt the construction proffered by the patentee.”). 
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/7
2019] PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER 1087 
construed so that the only plausible reading is that they are ineligible by 
clear and convincing evidence.260 
As the Supreme Court reshaped the process for determining subject 
matter eligibility, the Alice test became prevalent in determinations of 
subject matter eligibility at the pleading stage of litigation.261 This is 
apparent when comparing the second and third Federal Circuit decisions 
in the Ultramercial litigation. None of the guidance cautioning district 
courts from deciding eligibility at the motion to dismiss stage is present 
in the third decision.262 Instead, the Federal Circuit performed the Alice 
test and found the claims ineligible.263 
2. After Mayo and Alice, the number of motions to dismiss for
lack of eligibility increased sharply.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo, practitioners began to 
implement the strategy of challenging a patent’s subject matter eligibility 
early in litigation.264 This strategy allowed defendants to end cases 
relatively quickly without going through the expense of discovery.265 The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Alice cemented the two-part test as the 
standard for determining subject matter eligibility, and the Federal Circuit 
implemented the test at the motion to dismiss stage. After these 
developments, the strategy of challenging eligibility on the pleadings was 
often successful and continued to gain popularity. 
The success of the strategy to challenge eligibility is evident from 
the number of cases in which motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
eligibility appear. In 2013, the year before Alice, district courts considered 
 260.  Id. (“This case involves Rule 12(b)(6), which requires courts to accept the well-pleaded 
factual allegations as true and to require the accused infringer to establish that the only plausible 
reading of the claims is that, by clear and convincing evidence, they cover ineligible subject matter.”). 
 261.  Addy, supra note 12 (“Armed with Alice, infringement defendants successfully convinced 
district courts to use the Alice decision’s alleged ‘teachings,’ found in loose language, to suffocate 
patent infringement cases before they even got started—by invalidating patents on the pleadings.”). 
 262.  Compare Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1335 with Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 
709, 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 263.  See Ultramercial 772 F.3d at 714 (describing the Alice test, which the court subsequently 
applied finding the claims ineligible). 
 264.  See O’Byrne, supra note 13, at 405 (“[D]efendants charged with infringement of these 
types of patents have successfully moved for early dismissal of method claims on the grounds that 
the claims asserted against them were nothing more than ‘abstract ideas’ and therefore outside the 
scope of patent eligible subject matter.”). 
 265.  Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 624 (“[S]everal of the new mechanisms of quick decisions 
provide routes to resolve patent disputes before discovery, which is when litigation costs begin to 
escalate significantly . . . .”). 
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11 motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter eligibility.266 In 2014, that 
number rose to 24.267 In 2015, the year after the Supreme Court decided 
Alice, the district courts considered 101 motions to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter ineligibility.268 
3. The Federal Circuit usually affirms pleading stage dismissals
for lack of eligibility.
Since Alice, the Federal Circuit has issued opinions in 29 cases in 
which the district court granted a motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter eligibility.269 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal in 20 of those cases,270 reversed the district court’s dismissal in 
 266.  Id. at 660 (“In 2016, district courts decided 149 pleading-stage eligibility motions, up from 
101 in 2015, 24 in 2014, and 11 in 2013.”). 
267.  Id. 
268.  Id. 
269.  See Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Endo Pharm. 
Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019); ChargePoint, Inc. v. 
SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 763 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Nat. Alts. Int’l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, 
LLC, 918 F.3d 1338, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Voit Techs., LLC v. Del-Ton, Inc., 757 Fed. Appx. 1000, 
1000 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743, 
743 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Glasswall Sols., Ltd. v. Clearswift, Ltd., 754 Fed. Appx. 996, 997 (Fed. Cir. 
2018); Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Data Engine 
Techs., LLC v. Google, LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Interval Licensing, LLC v. AOL, 
Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Burnett v. Panasonic Corp, 741 Fed. Appx. 777, 778 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (per curiam); SAP Am., Inc. v. Investpic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2018); 
Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys. & Software, LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Aatrix 
Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Intellectual 
Ventures I, LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 711 Fed. Appx. 1012, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Two-Way Media, 
Ltd. V. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Secured Mail Sols., 
LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Visual Memory, LLC v. NVIDIA 
Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Cleveland Clinic Found. V. True Health Diagnostics, 
LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 
1315, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 
2016); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 
Shortridge v. Found. Constr. Payroll Serv., LLC, 655 Fed. Appx. 848, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per 
curiam); BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs. V. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2016); TLI Commc’ns, LLC v. AV Auto., LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Genetic Techs., 
Ltd. v. Merial, LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Vehicle Intelligence & Safety, LLC v. 
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 635 Fed. Appx. 914, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Content 
Extraction & Transmission, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 710 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 270.  See ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 763; Voit, 757 Fed. Appx. at 1000; Athena Diagnostics, 915 
F.3d at 743; Glasswall, 754 Fed. Appx. at 997; Interval Licensing, 896 F.3d at 1336; Burnett, 741 
Fed. Appx. at 778; SAP, 890 F.3d at 1018; Voter Verified, 887 F.3d at 1376; Two-Way, 874 F.3d at 
1329; Intellectual Ventures, 711 Fed. Appx. at 1012; Secured Mail, 873 F.3d at 905; Cleveland Clinic 
Found., 859 F.3d at 1352; Intellectual Ventures, 850 F.3d at 1315; FairWarning IP, 839 F.3d at 1089; 
Shortridge, 655 Fed. Appx. at 848; TLI Commc’ns, 823 F.3d at 607; Genetic Techs., 818 F.3d at 1369; 
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eight cases,271 and affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part in one case.272 
These figures only take into account cases in which the Federal Circuit 
issued a written opinion. Under Federal Circuit Rule 36, the court can 
affirm a judgement without issuing a written opinion.273 Rule 36 has been 
used to affirm district court dismissals for lack of subject matter eligibility 
on the pleadings.274 However, Rule 36 affirmances are not considered in 
these figures. 
The Federal Circuit affirms dismissal for lack of subject matter 
eligibility a majority of the time.275 The Federal Circuit’s formula when 
reviewing these cases is to review the claims at issue, state the Alice test, 
and perform the Alice test. The Federal Circuit rarely addresses the 
standards for examining Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c) motions or their 
impact on the Alice test. A notable exception to this formula is found in 
the Aatrix decision, where the Federal Circuit gave guidance specific to 
determining eligibility on the pleadings.276 
4. Aatrix may signal a return to the reasoning against deciding
eligibility on the pleadings outlined in the second Ultramercial
decision.
In Aatrix, the Federal Circuit stated that the question of subject 
matter eligibility was a question of law with underlying questions of fact 
and that factual allegations taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
may preclude a dismissal at the pleading stage.277 After Alice, the Federal 
Circuit primarily referred to subject matter eligibility as a pure question 
of law, which made it easier for defendants to successfully invalidate 
Vehicle Intelligence, 635 Fed. Appx. at 915; Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1343; Ultramercial, 772 
F.3d at 710. 
 271.  See Cellspin Soft, 927 F.3d at 1307; Endo Pharm., 919 F.3d at 1347; Nat. Alts., 918 F.3d 
at 1339; Ancora, 908 F.3d at 1343; Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1121; Visual Memory, 867 F.3d at 1253; 
McRO, 837 F.3d at 1300; BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1342. 
272.  See Data Engine, 906 F.3d at 1000. 
273.  FED. CIR. R. 36. (“The court may enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion.”). 
274.  Addy, supra note 12 (“In most cases, the Court declined to craft any sort of explanatory 
opinion, relying instead on its ability to issue a one-word decision—’Affirmed.’”). 
 275.  See Addy, supra note 12 (“After four years, over 90% of cases appealed to the Federal 
Circuit on patent ineligibility grounds have been affirmed.”). 
 276.  See Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1125 (stating that eligibility can be determined at the Rule 12 stage 
and describing the standards from making that determination).  
 277.  Id. (“This is true only when there are no factual allegations that, taken as true, prevent 
resolving the eligibility question as a matter of law.”). 
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patents for lack of subject matter eligibility on the pleadings.278 After 
Aatrix, the Federal Circuit has consistently referred to subject matter 
eligibility as a question of law with underlying questions of fact.279 
Aatrix marks a return to some of the reasoning in Ultramercial for 
avoiding subject matter eligibility determinations on the pleadings. 
However, the Federal Circuit seems to be construing Aatrix narrowly280 
and continues to consistently affirm invalidations for lack of eligibility on 
the pleadings.281 The Federal Circuit has the tools it needs to curb subject 
matter eligibility dismissals on the pleadings; it just needs to implement 
them. 
B. The Federal Circuit’s current application of the Alice test at the 
Rule 12 stage favors alleged infringers. 
The Federal Circuit should provide guidance against determining 
subject matter eligibility on the pleadings because its current application 
of the Alice test favors alleged infringers. While examining patent 
eligibility on the pleadings, courts usually perform the Alice test and 
decide whether the patent is invalid for claiming unpatentable subject 
matter. 
A ruling of invalidity has serious consequences for an inventor or 
patent holder.282 When a court invalidates a patent, the patentee loses all 
rights granted by the patent.283 The inventor or patent holder loses the 
current lawsuit and is prevented from enforcing the patent against any 
other infringers in the future. A ruling of invalidity in a previous case is a 
complete defense to infringement in a latter case; however, a patent that 
 278.  E.g.,Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017); 
Genetic Techs., Ltd. v. Merial, LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Vehicle Intelligence & 
Safety, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 635 Fed. Appx. 914, 917 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 279.  E.g., SAP Am., Inc. v. Investpic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Interval 
Licensing, LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Ancora Techs. v. HTC Am., 
Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  
 280.  Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(Moore, J., concurring) (“Our decisions in Berkheimer and Aatrix are narrow: to the extent it is at 
issue in the case, whether a claim element or combination is well-understood, routine, and 
conventional is a question of fact.”). 
 281.  E.g., Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys. & Software, LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018); SAP Am., Inc. v. Investpic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Burnett v. 
Panasonic Corp, 741 Fed. Appx. 777, 778 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 282.  Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 628 (“A ruling of patent invalidity is the outcome of a patent 
case that can have the most significant impact going forward, both on the parties and on nonparties.”). 
 283.  Id. (“[O]nce a litigant convinces a court to hold a particular patent invalid, any litigant 
accused of infringing the same patent in the future may use that invalidity decision as a complete 
defense.”). 
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is found valid in one case may still be invalidated in a later case.284 In a 
scenario where an inventor’s patent is infringed by multiple parties, the 
patentee must successfully argue infringement in each case. However, if 
the first alleged infringer successfully argues invalidity, the inventor not 
only loses that case but also can no longer assert his patent rights against 
any of the other alleged infringers. The permanence of an invalidity ruling 
presents patent holders with a large risk when asserting patent rights. 
This system is designed to prevent patent holders from broadly 
asserting weak patents.285 However, this system, designed to protect 
defendants, can also be used offensively by alleged infringers to deter 
infringement suits when invalidity decisions become easy to obtain. If 
invalidity rulings are too easy to achieve, then the risk patent holders face 
when asserting patent rights becomes too high. If inventors are not able to 
effectively assert patents, then the incentive for inventors to seek patent 
protection drastically decreases. 
Society may see short term benefits when a patent is invalidated. 
Technology disclosed in the patent becomes free for others to use. 
However, if invalidity decisions are too easy to obtain and patent holders 
cannot enjoy the rights a patent grants, then the use of the patent system 
may decline. Disclosure of inventions to the public would then decrease 
and harm the progress of technology in the long run. 
After Mayo and Alice, alleged infringers adopted the strategy of 
challenging the validity of patents at the pleading stage.286 This strategy 
worked well for challenging subject matter eligibility because it is the 
least factually intensive validity analysis and the decisions in Mayo and 
Alice made subject matter eligibility more difficult to prove for several 
technologies, including computer software, medical diagnostics, and 
biotechnology.287 The Federal Circuit’s consistent affirmation of 
dismissals for lack of eligibility encourages defendants to continue using 
 284.  Id. (“Thus, although a patentee may not use a ruling that its patent is not invalid offensively 
in a future case, an accused infringer may defensively use a prior ruling that a patent is invalid.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 285.  See id. at 663 (“[E]ligibility provides a mechanism to dismiss low-merit suits before the 
parties incur significant litigation costs.”). 
 286.  Addy, supra note 12 (“Armed with Alice, infringement defendants successfully convinced 
district courts to use the Alice decision’s alleged ‘teachings,’ found in loose language, to suffocate 
patent infringement cases before they even got started—by invalidating patents on the pleadings.”). 
 287.  See Garza, supra note 33, at 5 (“[S]oftware patents have had a difficult time with 
eligibility.”); Shai Jalfin, 6 Years Later: The Effects of the Mayo Decision on Diagnostic Methods, 
IPWATCHDOG (Jul. 19, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/19/6-years-later-effects-mayo-
decision-diagnostic-methods/id=99206/ [https://perma.cc/WKY5-88QE] (“In the 6 years since Mayo, 
the life sciences have been hit hard, with the validity of method patents being frequently–and 
successfully–challenged.”). 
39
Kanel: Patent Eligible Subject Matter
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
1092 AKRON LAW REVIEW [53:1053 
motions at the pleading stage to invalidate patents.288 The Federal 
Circuit’s consistent affirmation of dismissals also encourages district 
courts to continue making determinations of eligibility on the pleadings 
to quickly resolve cases.289 
There is a balance between protecting defendants from excessive 
assertion of weak patents and making patents so easy to invalidate that 
patent holders cannot effectively assert their rights. These quick decisions 
of subject matter eligibility on the pleadings favor alleged infringers by 
making it too risky for inventors and patent holders to assert their patents. 
As a result, certain technological areas including computer software, 
medical diagnostics and biotechnology are being harmed. A decision of 
invalidity has significant consequences, and these decisions should not be 
made lightly. The Federal Circuit currently favors quick eligibility 
decisions and therefore favors alleged infringers. The Federal Circuit 
should provide guidance to the district courts preventing decisions of 
eligibility at the Rule 12 stage so that patentees, the people who innovate 
and advance technology, are favored. 
C. The Federal Circuit’s application of the Alice test at the Rule 12 
stage is not consistent with the standards for evaluating the 
sufficiency of pleadings. 
Determining subject matter eligibility on the pleadings in tension 
with the standards for pleadings and the presumption of validity of 
patents. Under the standards described in Twombly and Iqbal, a complaint 
survives a motion to dismiss when the claim for relief is plausible.290 
When examining a motion to dismiss, courts must make take all alleged 
facts in the complaint as true.291 The decisions in Berkheimer and Aatrix 
show that the subject matter eligibility analysis contains underlying 
 288.  See O’Byrne, supra note 13, at 406 (“Seizing the opportunity created by the trend of 
invalidating method claims under § 101 and the factious nature of the appellate rulings that have 
considered this issue, defendants have sought early dismissal or disposition pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
and Rule 12(c) on § 101 grounds.”). 
 289.  See Addy, supra note 12 (“Armed with Alice, infringement defendants successfully 
convinced district courts to use the Alice decision’s alleged ‘teachings,’ found in loose language, to 
suffocate patent infringement cases before they even got started—by invalidating patents on the 
pleadings.”). 
 290.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face.’”). 
 291.  Id. (“[A] court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is 
inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). 
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factual issues.292 When examining eligibility on the pleadings, the courts 
usually perform the Alice test and decide whether the claims are eligible. 
However, this practice tends to ignore the factual considerations. 
Performing the Alice test to determine eligibility is not the same as 
examining whether the plaintiff has made a plausible complaint. 
Instead of quickly providing a ruling on eligibility in response to a 
Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c) motion, courts should consider whether there 
is a plausible claim construction and plausible factual allegations that 
make the claims eligible. To successfully invalidate a patent on the 
pleadings, the defendant should have to show that there is no plausible 
claim construction or factual allegations that make the claims eligible.293 
Additionally, patents are presumed to be valid.294 So, to prevail on 
the pleadings, the defendant should have to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that there is no plausible claim construction and set of facts 
under which the patent is eligible.295 
Each issued patent has gone through examination at the patent office. 
If the patent office determined that a claim set is allowable, then the office 
construed the claims in a manner that meets the subject matter eligibility 
requirements during examination. The fact that the patent office found a 
claim construction in which the claims are eligible should weigh heavily 
in favor of a finding that there is a plausible claim construction that 
renders the patent valid. 
The Federal Circuit should provide guidance that shifts the focus of 
eligibility determinations on the pleadings from performing the Alice test 
to examining whether there is a plausible claim construction and set of 
facts that would render the patent eligible. Shifting the focus from the 
Alice test to the plausibility of the pleadings will bring the subject matter 
eligibility analysis at the pleading stage into line with the standards for 
evaluating pleadings outlined in Twombly and Iqbal.296 It will also give 
 292.  Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Patent eligibility under 
35 U.S.C. § 101 is ultimately an issue of law we review de novo. The patent eligibility inquiry may 
contain underlying issues of fact.”) (citation omitted); Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades 
Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We have held that patent eligibility can be 
determined at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. This is true only when there are no factual allegations that, 
taken as true, prevent resolving the eligibility question as a matter of law.”) (citation omitted). 
 293.  See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he only 
plausible reading of the patent must be that there is clear and convincing evidence of ineligibility.”). 
 294.  Id. at 1338 (“[E]very issued patent is presumed to have been issued properly, absent clear 
and convincing evidence to the contrary.”). 
295.  See id. 
 296.  See Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 662 (“But explicitly acknowledging the factual components 
of the eligibility analysis would nudge courts to more carefully apply the Twombly and Iqbal 
framework. Rather than simply issuing a yes-or-no decision on the patent’s validity, as sometimes 
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courts the chance to apply the presumption of validity to the eligibility 
analysis at the pleading stage. 
D. The Alice test is not conducive to implementation at the Rule 12 
stage when the record is undeveloped. 
The Federal Circuit should provide guidance against deciding 
eligibility on the pleadings because the Alice test is not conducive to being 
performed at the pleading stage of litigation. When the Supreme Court 
created the two-step test for patent eligibility in Mayo, it was examining 
a case at the motion for summary judgement stage of litigation.297 When 
the Court solidified this test in Alice, the case was also at the summary 
judgement stage.298 Afterwards, the Federal Circuit and district courts 
have been applying the Alice test early in litigation at the pleading stage.299 
However, the structure of the Alice test makes it difficult to perform 
adequately at the pleading stage of litigation. 
Both steps of the Alice test are focused on the claims.300 When the 
Supreme Court created and applied the Alice test, it had the benefit of a 
developed record. However, the record is not well developed at the 
pleading stage, and this becomes problematic when examining the claims. 
Summary judgement usually occurs after claim construction, so the court 
and parties know how the claims are interpreted. Before claim 
construction, the claims usually contain some level of ambiguity that 
causes the parties to disagree on their scope. While ambiguity and 
disagreement are present, it is more difficult for the court to determine 
whether the claims are directed to a patent ineligible concept and whether 
there are additional elements that could transform the claim into an 
eligible application.301 
seems to be the case, dismissal would be appropriate only if, viewing the relevant facts in the light 
most favorable to the patentee, there is no plausible case that the patent satisfies the eligibility 
requirement.”) (citation omitted). 
 297.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 76 (2012) (“[T]he 
District Court ultimately granted summary judgment in Mayo’s favor.”). 
 298.  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 214 (2014) (“[T]he parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the asserted claims are eligible for patent protection 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”). 
 299.  Addy, supra note 12 (“Armed with Alice, infringement defendants successfully convinced 
district courts to use the Alice decision’s alleged ‘teachings,’ found in loose language, to suffocate 
patent infringement cases before they even got started—by invalidating patents on the pleadings.”). 
 300.  See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (“First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to 
one of those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, ‘what else is there in the claims before 
us?’”) (citation omitted). 
 301.  See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(“[I]n this case, claim construction is helpful to resolve the question of patentability under § 101. 
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The Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that subject matter 
eligibility can be determined without claim construction.302 At the same 
time, however, the court praises the helpfulness of claim construction in 
determining eligibility.303 Instead of stating that claim construction is not 
required to determine eligibility, the Federal Circuit should give specific 
guidance on how to treat claim construction when examining eligibility 
on the pleadings. 
The Federal Circuit should return to the guidance it gave in 
Ultramercial. When examining eligibility at the Rule 12 stage without 
claim construction, the court should use the plaintiff’s claim construction 
or the claim construction most favorable to the plaintiff.304 Alternatively, 
the court could postpone an eligibility determination until formal claim 
construction is complete.305 
Both practitioners and judges recognize that the subject matter 
eligibility analysis has problems and requires further attention from the 
Supreme Court or Congress.306 However, eligibility is not the only avenue 
available to defendants to attack a patent’s validity. As Judge Plager 
suggests, the Federal Circuit should encourage district courts to delay 
deciding eligibility until later in litigation.307 This allows for the court to 
complete claim construction and allow the factual record to develop. 
Given the focus of the Alice test on the claims and the factual questions 
underlying the eligibility analysis, allowing the court time to construe the 
claims and consider underlying facts should result in more consistent 
Specifically, the parties’ dispute about whether the ‘first set of rules’ must evaluate sequential 
phonemes or can evaluate individual phonemes is resolved by the claim language.”).  
 302.  See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[C]laim 
construction may not always be necessary for a § 101 analysis.”); Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green 
Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that the court does not need to 
perform a full claim construction before deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of eligibility). 
 303.  See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1311 (“[I]n this case, claim construction is helpful to resolve the 
question of patentability under § 101.”). 
 304.  See Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1339 (“It may also be feasible for the district court to choose 
to construe the claims in accordance with this court’s precedent, or to adopt the construction proffered 
by the patentee.”). 
 305.  See id. at 1340 (“[T]he question of eligible subject matter must be determined on a claim-
by-claim basis. Construing every asserted claim and then conducting a § 101 analysis may not be a 
wise use of judicial resources.”). 
 306.  See Interval Licensing, LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1353–55 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(Plager, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (noting that other judges have critiqued the 
subject matter eligibility analysis and stating that “[t]here is almost universal criticism among 
commentators and academicians that the ‘abstract idea’ idea has created havoc in the patent law.”). 
 307.  Id. at 1355 (Plager, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (“[A] district court in an 
appropriate case might choose to exercise control over its docket by instructing a defendant who raises 
an ‘abstract ideas’ § 101 defense that the court will defer addressing that defense until first having the 
issues in §§ 102, 103, and 112 addressed.”).  
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eligibility decisions. Alternatively, if the patent is invalid on other 
grounds, then the court could avoid the eligibility question entirely. 
Avoiding the question of eligibility may be the best course of action to 
pursue until the Supreme Court or Congress reforms the standard for 
determining subject matter eligibility.308 
V. CONCLUSION 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, there 
has been an increase in Rule 12 motions to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter eligibility. These motions are often granted at the district court 
level and predominantly upheld by the Federal Circuit. This trend creates 
a hostile environment for inventors and patent holders and threatens to 
curb innovation in various areas like computer software, biotechnology, 
and medical diagnostics. The Federal Circuit’s current application of the 
Alice test at the Rule 12 stage favors alleged infringers and is inconsistent 
with the standards for evaluating pleadings. Additionally, the Alice test is 
not conducive to being performed at the pleading stage of litigation. 
Therefore, the Federal Circuit should instruct the district courts to refrain 
from deciding eligibility at the pleading stage of litigation. 
 308.  See id. at 1356 (Plager, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Even a cursory look 
at the claims in our recent § 101 ‘abstract ideas’ cases suggests how many of those cases would just 
go away as soon as the well-understood statutory criteria are applied to the challenged claims.”). 
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